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Abstract—Flow-based DDoS attack detection is typically per-
formed by analysis applications that are installed on or close
to a flow collector. Although this approach allows for easy
deployment, it makes detection far from real-time and susceptible
to DDoS attacks for the following reasons. First, the fact that
the flow export process is timeout-based and that flow collectors
typically provide data to analysis applications in chunks, can
result in detection delays in the order of several minutes. Second,
by the nature of flow export, attack traffic may be amplified by
the flow export process if the original packets are small enough
and are part of small flows.
We have shown in a previous work how to perform DDoS
attack detection on a flow exporter instead of a flow collector,
i.e., close to the data source and in a real-time fashion, which
however required access to a fully-extendible flow monitoring
infrastructure. In this work, we investigate whether it is possible
to operate the same detection system on a widely deployed
networking platform: Cisco IOS. Since our ultimate goal is to
identify besides the presence of an attack also attackers and
targets, we rely on NetFlow. In this context, we present our
DDoS attack detection prototype that has shown to generate a
constant load on the underlying platform – even under attacks
– underlining that DDoS attack detection can be performed on
a Cisco Catalyst 6500 in production networks, if enough spare
capacity is available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are becoming a
major technical and economical threat, overloading networks
and servers with large amounts of network traffic. In early
2014, CloudFlare was hit by an amplified UDP flooding attack,
reaching nearly 400 Gbps in bandwidth [1]. Although UDP
flooding attacks typically aim at overloading targets with a vast
number of bytes, there are also other attacks, such as TCP SYN
flooding attacks, that result in a large number of connections.
By the definition of a flow, “a set of packets passing an
observation point in the network during a certain time interval,
such that all packets belonging to a certain flow have a set of
common properties” [2], this also results in a large number
of flows. This makes it possible for flow-based technologies
to detect such volume-based attacks [3]. Moreover, the use
of flow export technologies, such as NetFlow and the recent
IETF standardization effort IPFIX, are especially useful since
they generate traffic aggregates. This approach reduces the
amount of data to be analyzed significantly [4], as well as
the necessary processing power for export and collection.
Furthermore, these technologies are widely available on packet
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Fig. 1. Typical flow monitoring architecture.
forwarding devices, making the flow data easily accessible and
the technologies easy to deploy in existing networks.
Flow-based intrusion detection in general – DDoS attack
detection is no exception – is traditionally performed by
analysis applications [5]–[7], as shown in Fig. 1. These
applications operate on flow data exported by flow exporters
and collected by flow collectors. Since the export of flow
data is heavily based on timeouts and the collection is often
designed to work in time intervals of several minutes, analysis
applications are subject to various delays in the detection
process [8]. Especially in the case of DDoS attack detection,
where overload of network infrastructure can happen very
quickly, this is something that must be avoided.
Recent work has shown that moving detection closer to the
data source decreases detection delays significantly, from at
least 165 seconds to 10 seconds [9]. The presented DDoS
attack detection algorithm runs on a platform targeted at
passive data export based on flows, namely INVEA-TECHs
FlowMon platform. The goal of this paper is to investigate
whether the detection algorithm presented in [9] can be
deployed on a widely available networking platform. In this
context, we target Cisco’s IOS platform and in particular the
Cisco Catalyst 6500, which is one of the most widely deployed
packet forwarding devices [10]. We focus in particular on the
operational experience of performing intrusion detection on
packet forwarding devices in production networks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the terminology related to NetFlow and
IPFIX that is used throughout this paper. An overview of the
original detection algorithm from [9] is given in Section III.
In Section IV, we explain how the required monitoring in-
formation, which serves as input to the detection algorithm,
can be obtained from Cisco IOS. The implemented prototype
is discussed Section V, which will be used for the validation
presented in Section VI. In Section VII, we elaborate on fur-
ther possibilities for DDoS attack detection and mitigation in
Cisco IOS. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VIII.
II. FLOW METERING & EXPORT
In this section, we introduce the terminology related to flow
metering and export that will be used throughout this paper.
For a comprehensive overview of NetFlow and IPFIX, we refer
to the tutorial in [4].
Flow metering and export are the two tasks performed by a
flow exporter [4], as shown in Fig. 1. Packets in the network
are aggregated into flows by the Metering Process. When a
new flow is observed, an entry for this flow is created in the
flow cache. This cache is a table that stores information on
active flows in the network [4]. Aside from the key of the flow,
i.e., the fields that identify a flow, some extra information is
typically accounted, such as the number of packets and bytes
in the flow. We refer to the event in which the cache is full and
a flow cache entry cannot be created, which can happen during
periods of high traffic if the flow cache is under-dimensioned,
as a flow learn failure [11]. When a flow cache entry expires,
for example when the flow has been active or idle for too long
or because of resource constraints, a flow record is exported,
i.e., it is inserted in a NetFlow or IPFIX message and sent to
a collector for storage and pre-processing.
III. DETECTION ALGORITHM
We use an existing algorithm that has proven to satisfy
the requirements of being lightweight, accurate and real-time
in the context of DDoS attack detection, described in [9].
The algorithm1 runs on a fixed time interval and measures
the number of flow cache entry creations, as this metric was
shown to be most usable of the four metrics presented in
[9]. Based on this measurement, a forecast is made for the
measurement value of the next interval. In case the number
of flow cache entry creations is too high in comparison
with the past measurement values, the measurement sample
is considered anomalous. However, because Internet traffic
shows diurnal patterns, such as strong increases and decreases
in the number of flow cache entry creations during the start and
end of a working day respectively, the algorithm also learns
the normal behaviour of the network over a 24 hour period.
The forecasted value is therefore defined as:
xˆt+1 = bt + st , (1)
where xˆt+1 is the forecasted value for the next interval,
bt the base component, sometimes referred to as permanent
component, which represents the trend of the Internet traffic,
and st the seasonal component that represents diurnal patterns.
Several enhancements to this algorithm are discussed in [9].
First, in order to decrease memory usage, the values used
for retaining seasonal patterns, st, are stored per hour and
interpolated to estimate the value for a given time. Second, to
prevent the algorithm from learning malicious traffic patterns,
values such as st and bt are discarded during an attack.
Last, since traffic patterns during weekends usually differ
from patterns during weekdays, a distinction is made between
1In [9] two algorithms are described. We use Algorithm 2, which showed
the best results.
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Fig. 2. Flow cache entry creations in Cisco IOS over time.
weekend and weekdays for season memory. This results in
two training periods, one for weekdays and one for weekends.
IV. MONITORING INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN IOS
The detection algorithm considered in this paper, which has
been summarized in Section III, is heavily based on a single
metric, namely the number of flow cache entry creations per
time interval. This metric is easily accessible on the flow
monitoring platform used in the original work of the prototype
([9]), INVEA-TECH’s FlowMon. Since that platform has been
designed with extendibility in mind, this information is directly
available from the platform’s API. However, the amount of
information available in IOS strongly depends on the path
the packet or flow has taken within the router or switch.
More precisely, packets are switched either in hardware or
in software, although most packets are hardware-switched.
On the campus network of the University of Twente (UT),
for example, 99.6% of the traffic is hardware-switched [11].
Situations that trigger a packet to be switched in software
are fragmented packets, packets destined to the forwarding
device itself, and packets that require ARP resolution [12], for
example. For flows processed in hardware, information on the
number of flow cache entry creations is not directly available.
To approximate this metric, we use the following information
available from the flow metering and exporting process:
• Number of flow cache entries (Fc).
• Number of exported software-switched flow records (Fe).
• Number of flow learn failures (Ff ). This metric is ex-
pressed in terms of packets, rather than flows.
The number of flow cache entry creations since the last mea-
surement can be approximated using the following definition:
F = ∆Fc + ∆Fe +
∆Ff
cf
(2)
When flow cache entries are exported, Fc will decrease which
will cause the approximation to be less accurate if the mea-
surement intervals are too long. For example, in Fig. 2, if the
measurement were to cover two intervals, from t = 2 to t = 4,
∆Fc will not consider the peak at t = 3. By polling Fc more
frequently, we can observe the changes more accurately, such
that we observe the positive ∆Fc at t = 3 and the negative
∆Fc at t = 4, which is caused by exports. Then, if ∆Fc is
negative, we use an estimation of previous ∆Fc values instead.
When the flow cache is nearing its capacity limit, the exporter
issues an emergency expiration [4]. In Fig. 2 this is depicted
in the shaded area. As Fc reaches Cm, the flow cache capacity,
most flow cache entries are expired. If a measurement is made
between t = 6 and t = 7, the algorithm may detect this as an
attack for one measurement interval, due to the vast increase
in the numer of cache entries compared to t = 6. To counteract
this, the implementation waits for the next measurement if it
suspects an attack, to validate whether it is an actual attack.
This does however increase the detection delay.
Since the number of entries in the flow cache (Fc) only
regards hardware-switched flows, we also add the number of
exported software-switched flows (Fe), which can be obtained
directly from IOS. Finally, adding Ff allows for regarding
flows that should have been created but were not, which is
especially the case during high-intensity DDoS attacks, for
example. To compensate for the fact that Ff is expressed
in packets while the other metrics are expressed in flows,
we divide Ff by the average number of packets per flow,
represented by cf in Equation 2.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
The Embedded Event Manager (EEM) – part of Cisco’s IOS
that handles real-time network event detection – allows for the
definition of policies, which can be used to execute an applet
or script when events are triggered. For example, emails can
be sent to network administrators when round-trip times reach
a certain limit, or when network route changes occur. Another
event type is based on time. This event can, among others,
be scheduled at fixed time intervals. In this work, we use two
time-based policies, implemented as TCL scripts:2
• Measurement policy – Determines the first component
for our approximation of the flow-based metric: the num-
ber of flow cache entries (Fc), as described in Section IV.
• Detection policy – Retrieves the remaining components:
the number of exported software flows (Fe) and the
number of flow learn failures (Ff ). Also, it implements
the actual DDoS attack detection algorithm.
To obtain all three components, which are all made available
using the SNMP protocol, we use a feature of the EEM
environment that provides access to local SNMP objects. The
reason for splitting the measurement policy from the detection
policy is that we require a higher resolution for the former to
detect changes more accurately, as described in Section IV.
Policy invocations are memoryless, and since we want to
share data – both between policy runs and between policies –
a method for sharing data needs to be implemented. Due to
the fact that the filesystem is flash-based, we generally want to
avoid excessive write actions that will shorten the memory’s
lifespan. The EEM environment therefore offers a Context
library for this purpose; it allows for saving TCL variables to
memory instead of writing them to disk. Besides for keeping
2The open-source TCL scripts can be retrieved from
https://github.com/ut-dacs/ios-ddos-detect/
track of our data between policy runs, we also use this feature
to exchange information between the two policies, as the result
of the measurement policy is needed by the detection policy.
The two policies discussed before are executed by the EEM
at their respective intervals, which have been selected based
on the runtime of the respective policies. When the switch
is however under heavy load, its higher CPU utilization will
cause the policies to take longer to execute. To avoid the
policies from skipping an execution when the runtime of the
policy exceeds the length of the interval, the prototype utilizes
a feature from the EEM that can set a maximum policy
runtime. If this runtime is exceeded, the policy terminates
forcibly and data is lost. In the case of the detection policy,
the algorithm has to start again from the learning phase as
all state data is lost. If the measurement policy terminates
prematurely, the measured number of created flow cache
entries will be lower, as it missed a measurement, which will
slightly impact the accuracy of the algorithm. To prevent the
detection policy from being killed, a margin has been added to
the interval which allows it to run longer if necessary, but never
longer than the interval at which it is executed. The average
runtime of the detection policy is 2–3 seconds under normal
conditions, and has shown to reach 7–8 seconds under stress.
Therefore, the final interval chosen for the detection policy is
10 seconds. For the measurement policy, measurements have
shown that 2 seconds provides an optimal balance between
detailed measurements and loss of data due to termination.
VI. VALIDATION
In this section, we describe the validation of this work,
starting by identifying the requirements in Section VI-A. Next,
we give a description of the validation setup, as well as
specifics regarding the deployment, in Section VI-B. Finally,
we discuss the results in Section VI-C.
A. Requirements
Three requirements were defined for the original detection
algorithm: 1) it should be lightweight in terms of CPU and
memory utilization, 2) the accuracy should be high enough
to ascertain a low number of false positives/negatives, and 3)
the detection delay should be reduced to roughly 10% of con-
ventional intrusion detection approaches [9]. However, since
the the Cisco Catalyst 6500 is a high-speed packet forwarding
device that has not been designed for performing intrusion
detection tasks, special care must be taken to not overload
the device and possibly interrupt forwarding activities. We
therefore relax the real-time requirement to detection within
30 seconds, while the CPU and memory utilization must
be 10% or lower. Since the accuracy of the algorithm has
already been validated in [9] and because it is invariant to the
underlying implementation platform, we discuss the accuracy
requirement only briefly.
B. Setup & Deployment
The implementation described in Section V has been devel-
oped on a Cisco Catalyst 6500 with Supervisor Engine 720,
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Fig. 4. Flow cache entry creations per second (averaged per 5 minutes), as processed by the detection algorithm over time.
running IOS 15.1(2)SY1. We have used this in combination
with the WS-X6708-10G-3C line card for 10 Gbps Ethernet
connectivity. The traffic used for validation is mirrored from
the uplink of the UT campus network to the Dutch National
Research and Education Network SURFnet and consists of
both educational traffic, i.e., traffic generated by faculties and
students, and traffic of campus residences. The link has a wire-
speed of 10 Gbps with an average throughput of 1.8 Gbps
during working hours. Furthermore, flow data is exported to a
flow collector, such that attacks detected by the prototype can
be validated manually.
The network traffic used in [9] differs from the network
traffic used in this work, both from its nature (backbone traffic
vs. campus traffic) and volume. It is therefore clear that we
have to adjust the parameters of the detection algorithm to
achieve similar accuracies as in [9]. As such, we have selected
the optimal parameter values3 for our observation point. For
the parameter cf , used for approximating the number of flow
cache entry creations, as described in Section IV, we have
measured cf = 59.8133 packets per flow on average in our
setup.
C. Results
The most important requirement to be validated in this
work is that the implementation must be light-weight, such
that the implementation does not interfere with the primary
activities of the packet forwarding device, namely routing and
switching. We measure the resource consumption both in terms
3The parameters used in this work are: cthreshold = 4.0, Mmin = 7000,
ccusum = 6.0, α = 2N+1 , where N = 540, and γ = 0.4.
of CPU and memory utilization. In Fig. 3, the CPU load of
the device is shown together with the memory utilization,
averaged over 150 seconds. Using SNMP, the load of the CPU
is measured for three components, namely the routing CPU,
which handles L3 traffic, and two switching CPUs, which
process traffic at L2. Once a routing or switching decision has
been made by the CPU, hardware handles subsequent packets
if possible. Furthermore, the routing CPU also handles the
network management (including the EEM), as most of this is
done on L3. Consequently, our EEM policies also run on the
routing CPU, and as such any load caused by our policies
should account to the load of the routing CPU.
In Fig. 3, the policies are active during the entire mea-
surement period, even in the period from August 24 18:00 to
August 25 16:00 where the switch received no data. Because
the CPU utilization of most individual processes is reported
as 0–1% and only peaks are reported as more than 1%,
we only consider the overal CPU usage. Consequently, the
overhead of managing and executing only the policies cannot
be observed. This overhead is caused by processes such as
the Chunk Manager, which handles memory allocation, EEM
Server, which manages all EEM policies and applets, and
SNMP ENGINE, which handles all SNMP requests. Because
the overhead of operating our policies is caused by multiple
processes, which also run when our implemented policies
are disabled, we have measured the difference in CPU and
memory utilization between operation with and without our
policies. To measure this, the switch has been rebooted to clear
all memory and CPU utilization. During the measurements, we
have observed a load on the routing CPU of 4%, combined
with a memory utilization of 31.3%. After enabling our poli-
cies we have observed an increase of 20% in CPU utilization,
and an increase of 0.2% in memory utilization. This accounts
for the average constant load added by our implementation.
During the period in which our detection algorithm was
deployed, one attack passed our validation network on August
25. The attack lasted around 20 minutes and consisted of DNS
reflection traffic and TCP traffic. During this attack, we only
observe a minor increase of the load of the switching CPU,
caused by the increased number of packets to be switched, and
no increase in load for the routing CPU. As such, we conclude
that the CPU load caused by our implementation during attacks
does not peak and instead only consists of the constant load.
The peaks in the load of the routing CPU, visible in Fig. 3,
are likely the effect of other routing or management processes
on the Catalyst 6500, as such processes are handled by the
routing CPU. In terms of memory utilization, we clearly
observe a stable pattern in Fig. 3. We do not observe any
increase in memory utilization during the attacks, which makes
us to conclude that the memory utilization does not create
significant peaks.
Considering the above measurements, we conclude that the
memory utilization does satisfy the requirement of using 10%
of memory or less. However, the 20% CPU load caused by
our implementation does not satisfy the requirement of 10%
CPU utilization or less. As the Catalyst 6500 is a packet
switching device and not meant to perform network attack
detection, such other activities should not interfere with its
main purpose of operation. As a load of 20% is probable
to cause interference with the routing and switching tasks,
we conclude that our implementation does not satisfy the
requirement to be light-weight. The difference between the
measured constant load and the lack of peaks in Fig. 3 can be
explained by the fact that the amount of traffic does not change
the number of computations performed by the policies, as only
the calculated values are different. Furthermore, the short and
frequent execution of the policies will be averaged out to a
constant added CPU load. Especially the short intervals in
which the measurement policy is executed (i.e., 2 seconds),
increases the load. However, increasing this interval would de-
crease the measurement resolution, as described in Section IV.
The second requirement is the detection delay. This re-
quirement, like the accuracy, has already been validated for
the prototype in [9]. Our implementation uses an interval
of 10 seconds between invocations of the algorithm, instead
of 5 seconds as in the original work, due to the runtime
of the algorithm, as described in Section V. This results in
detection delays of multiples of 10 seconds, with a minimum
of 10 seconds. The attack visible in Fig. 4 was detected within
the third interval, resulting in a detection delay of 30 seconds.
The final requirement considered in this work is the ac-
curacy of the DDoS attack detection. In Fig. 4, the number
of flow cache entry creations per measurement interval is
shown, averaged over 5 minute intervals. Weekends are shaded
in light-gray. Diurnal patterns are clearly distinguishable and
due to the nature of the traffic, we can also observe the
difference between weekdays and weekends. The anomalous
period around August 25 is caused by a lack of data as the
switch did not receive any traffic during this period. The
attack on August 25 is cleary distinguishable in Fig. 4. It
resulted in around 200% more flow records than predicted
by the algorithm, and lasted for roughly 20 minutes. Multiple
detection marks are shown, as the attack spanned multiple
5 minute intervals.
VII. DISCUSSION
The prototype presented in Section V retrieves information
from the underlying platform using SNMP. We know that
retrieving information using SNMP could be performed by any
other system, even a Raspberry Pi, maximizing the available
processing power of the forwarding device for routing and
switching. However, since our ultimate goal is to perform
attack mitigation that requires information on attackers and
targets, we deliberately perform detection on the forwarding
device itself (where NetFlow is available), which allows for
rapid deployment in production environments at no additional
cost.
Although the detection of attacks is a crucial first step, it
merely serves the ultimate goal: attack mitigation. In [9], not
only attack detection is discussed, but also mitigation. When
the detection algorithm is run and a measurement sample is
considered anomalous, mitigation is started by counting the
number of exported flow records per source IP address; as soon
as more than 200 flow records with three packets or less have
been exported per second for a particular source IP address,
the source IP address is blacklisted. Blacklisted IP addresses
are added to a firewall to block traffic from the attacker.
Furthermore, to prevent flow collectors from overloading, flow
records with these IP addresses are not sent to the collector.
When the algorithm detects the end of the attack, the created
rules are removed from the firewall.
The information used to identify attackers in [9] is not
available in IOS; only the total number of exported cache
entries is available. An alternative approach for identifying
attackers is to analyze the contents of the flow cache. However,
the IP addresses of attackers will be overrepresented in the
cache during a DDoS attack, since attackers generate large
amounts of traffic, resulting in a large number of flow cache
entries. However, the time needed to retrieve and process the
entire flow cache under load – which consists of at least 128k
entries, depending on the used hardware – can take up to tens
of seconds, making timely mitigation hardly possible.
A different approach to implement mitigation is the use of
an IOS feature that keeps track of the top x ∈ (0, 200) flows
featuring the highest volume, either in terms of packets or
bytes, referred to as NetFlow Top Talkers. This feature cannot
show the top talkers by the number of flows produced by a
host, which would be very high for sources of DDoS attacks.
Furthermore, it is likely that legitimate users will be in the
top talkers list, as they can generate just as many packets and
bytes. We therefore conclude that it is hard to identify the
attackers and set aside mitigation in this work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this research was to investigate the use of
high-end packet forwarding devices for detecting, and ulti-
mately mitigating, DDoS attacks in real-time. And yes, it is
possible to detect DDoS attacks, which has been proven by
the deployment of our prototype on a Cisco Catalyst 6500.
Our results show that detection of flooding attacks is possible
within tens of seconds, making real-time detection on a widely
available switching platform possible. However, our prototype
has also shown to cause a CPU load of 20%, which may
cause interference with the routing and switching processes.
According to various network operators we have stayed in
touch with during this work, if the capacity of the packet
forwarding device is available, it should be possible to run
our DDoS attack detection in production environments. While
it is possible to deploy our implementation with only 20–30%
CPU capacity available, for example, it would require to be
run with a lower priority, to not interfere with the routing
and switching processes. As this may cause instability to our
prototype, it is advised to have at least 40% CPU capacity
available.
Several requirements were identified beforehand, the first
being a small footprint of the implemented detection algo-
rithm. Validation results have shown that there is no visi-
ble increase in CPU and memory utilization during attacks.
However, when monitoring the overall increase in CPU and
memory utilization, an increase of 20% CPU and 0.2% mem-
ory utilization can be observed when running the prototype.
While the memory utilization satisfies the requirement of using
10% or less of the available resources, the CPU utilisation
does not satisfy this requirement. Second, validation of our
prototype in the UT campus network has shown that detec-
tion delays of 30 seconds are feasible for high intensity at-
tacks, satisfying the requirement of real-time detection (within
30 seconds). This corresponds to three times our measurement
interval of 10 seconds. Smaller measurement intervals may
decrease detection delays, but will make it more likely that our
detection runs overtime and is killed by a management process.
The last requirement for our implementation is detection
accuracy. Our validation results show that the number of false
positives is low, while the detection rate is high, because of
which we conclude that our prototype is accurate.
Mitigation is the next step, after detection. Our investigation
has shown that while it is possible to obtain enough informa-
tion to identify possible attackers, the command used to obtain
this information can take tens of seconds when the switch is
under heavy load, which occurs during flooding attacks. We
therefore conclude that real-time mitigation is not possible on
the hardware used in this work.
Future work includes investigating alternative implementa-
tions on different hardware. The successor of the Supervisor
Engine 720, the Supervisor Engine 2T, contains more powerful
hardware and provides additional functionality. This more
powerful hardware is likely to influence the load caused by our
implementation in a positive way, and potentially even allows
for real-time mitigation. Furthermore, a brief investigation has
shown that the Supervisor Engine 2T has the option of using
events upon flow cache entry creations. This could replace our
approximation of the number of flow cache entry creations,
as described in Section IV, and make it more accurate and
possibly faster.
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